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Phil Parhamovich was pulled over on I-80 in Wyoming.1 He had changed 
lanes improperly, and his seat belt was not fastened.2 Seven hundred 
seventy-five dollars would have been a reasonable fine. After all, Wyoming 
law requires seat belts.3 Failure to wear a seat belt is not grounds for a traffic 
stop,4 but if an officer stops a driver for some other reason, the officer is 
required to note whether the driver was wearing a seat belt; if so, the fine is 
reduced by $10.5 Otherwise, the fine will be increased by $25.6 On the other 
hand, improper lane usage is grounds for a traffic stop.7 A first offense is 
punishable by a fine of $200, or imprisonment for twenty days, or both.8 
Depending on the circumstances, improper lane usage could also be reckless 
driving,9 which carries a fine of $750, six months’ imprisonment, or both.10 
Parhamovich nearly lost $91,800.11  
The money represented his life savings; he was on his way to Wisconsin, 
where he planned to buy a music studio.12 During the traffic stop, though, 
under intensive questioning, he lied.13 When police suggested that the 
money was indicative of drug crimes and led Parhamovich to believe, 
incorrectly, that simply carrying so much cash was illegal,14 he claimed it 
belonged to a friend.15 The money was seized under suspicion that it—not 
Parhamovich—had been involved in a drug crime.16 Since Parhamovich had 
denied the money was his, he could not claim it.17 The fictional friend, of 
                                                          
1. German Lopez, “It’s Been Complete Hell”: How Police Used a Traffic Stop to Take $91,800 
From an Innocent Man, VOX (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/1/1668 
6014/phillip-parhamovich-civil-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/7GCB-NNAF]. 
2. Id.  
3. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-1402(a) (2017). 
4. Id. § 31-5-1402(d). 
5. Id. § 31-5-1402(e). 
6. Id. 
7. See id. § 31-5-209. 
8. Id. § 31-5-1201(b)(i). 
9. See id. § 31-5-229. 
10. Id. § 31-5-1201(f). 
11. Lopez, supra note 1. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (“He also became concerned, since he was questioned about cash and illegal drugs at the 
same time, that it was potentially against the law to carry so much cash at once.”). 
15. Id. 
16. Id.; see also Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil 
Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 916–917 (1991) 
(explaining civil forfeiture is in rem proceeding, property is defendant, only guilt of property is at issue, 
and guilt of objects “sounds uncomfortably like a theory of demonic possession.”). 
17. Lopez, supra note 1. 











course, also could not claim the money.18 As a result, the State of Wyoming 
maintained that the money was abandoned.19 The State maintained this, in 
part, because of Parhamovich’s statement that the money was not his.20 This 
statement is hearsay,21 but would be admissible, at least prima facie, as an 
opposing party statement.22 
At first glance, the Crawford doctrine might seem to supersede the 
opposing party statement exclusion.23 This doctrine prohibits the admission 
of testimonial hearsay against criminal defendants.24 Testimonial hearsay 
includes statements to the police during non-emergency investigations.25 
Parhamovich’s traffic stop was, at least arguably, not an emergency.26 The 
police, attempting to discover the source of Parhamovich’s money, were, at 
least arguably, in an investigatory phase.27 The Crawford doctrine might bar 
the use of this testimonial hearsay in court.28 But Parhamovich’s attorney 
could not make these arguments, for two reasons. First, Parhamovich did 
not receive notice of the forfeiture hearing.29 Second, even if he had been 
present or represented by counsel, the Crawford doctrine would not have 
applied. That is because the Crawford doctrine applies only in criminal 
                                                          
18. See id. (“But in letters to Parhamovich and court filings, state officials have essentially taken 
what happened at face value: They point out that Parhamovich said the cash wasn’t his, that he signed a 
waiver giving up the money, and that the ‘friend’ the cash supposedly belongs to hasn’t turned up.”). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. (quoting letter from Senior Assistant Attorney General John Brodie to Parhamovich) 
(“First and foremost, at the time of the stop, you denied having any interest in the currency, and also 
stated you were completely unaware it was hidden inside the portable speaker located in your vehicle.”). 
21. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
22. Id. 801(d)(2) (excluding from definition of hearsay a “statement . . . offered against an 
opposing party . . . and made by the party in an individual or representative capacity.”). 
23. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
24. See discussion infra Part I. 
25. See Joelle Anne Moreno, Finding Nino: Justice Scalia’s Confrontation Clause Legacy From 
Its (Glorious) Beginning To (Bitter) End, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1211, 1214–15 (2011). 
26. Cf. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827–29 (2006) (distinguishing emergency and non-
emergency situation for testimonial hearsay purposes). 
27. Compare id. (finding statements to police non-testimonial when made during an ongoing 
emergency) with Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 385 (2011) (finding statements to police testimonial 
where police were in “investigative role”). 
28. See infra Part I. These arguments would most likely not succeed, since 801(d)(2) is an 
exclusion, not an exception. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 57 (2012) (holding Crawford 
inapplicable to statements not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, an 801 exclusion). This, 
however, is not certain. See, e.g., Mark A. Summers, Taking Confrontation Seriously: Does Crawford 
Mean that Confessions Must Be Cross-Examined?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1805 (2012). Additionally, this may 
not be an 801(d)(2) opposing party statement at all. Civil forfeiture proceedings are against the property, 
not its owner. See Piety, supra note 16, at 16. Parhamovich is not a party, by the state’s own logic. At 
worst, he could be analogized to a codefendant, and testimonial codefendant statements are barred under 
Crawford. Cf. Moreno, supra note 25, at 1253–1254 (discussing admissibility of codefendant 
statements, but only where not testimonial). 












cases,30 and civil asset forfeiture proceedings are not considered criminal.31 
Yet the money was taken only because police suspected a crime. They 
presumably suspected Parhamovich was involved in the crime, but even if 
not, they believed the money was involved in the crime.32 Absent the 
suspicion that Parhamovich had committed a crime, he would not have 
faced forfeiture.33  
What is more, the proceeding, technically a civil case between the State 
of Wyoming and Parhamovich’s money, put Parhamovich in far greater 
jeopardy than his criminal case.34 Yet, under the Crawford doctrine, he 
would be protected by the Sixth Amendment from the admission of similar 
statements in his criminal case,35 but not his civil case. Justice Scalia, 
writing the Court’s opinion in Crawford, held that this strict bifurcation—
the full range of hearsay exclusions and exceptions applying in civil cases, 
while being superseded by the Constitution for certain forms of testimonial 
hearsay in criminal cases—was mandated by the Constitution’s text, as 
understood through historical precedent in Rome, England, and the early 
United States.36  
This Note casts doubt on Scalia’s historical analysis. It argues that the 
historical sources cited in Crawford and later cases suggest that the concerns 
regarding testimonial hearsay also apply in certain civil contexts. Civil asset 
forfeiture is a prime candidate: it shares important characteristics of criminal 
proceedings37 and imposes comparable penalties. Even if the Sixth 
Amendment is inapplicable in such proceedings, the logic of Crawford 
suggests that, as a policy matter, confrontation should be available in civil 
asset forfeiture proceedings.38 This could be done through legislation or 
through amendment of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FREs).  
This Note suggests that Crawford protections should be extended to 
citizens, like Phil Parhamovich, facing asset forfeiture. Part I explains the 
Crawford doctrine and its reasoning. Part II explores the history of 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in the United States and suggests that it 
belies a rigid separation between civil and criminal contexts. Part III 
                                                          
30. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004); see also U.S. CONST. amend VI (“In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him . . . .”). 
31. See Piety, supra note 16, at 916 (“Because the property, and not its owner, is the ‘defendant,’ 
it is only the property’s ‘guilt’ that is at issue . . . .”). 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
34. See supra notes 3–11 and accompanying text for comparison of remedies. 
35. Improper lane usage is a misdemeanor. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-1201(a) (2017). 
36. See infra Part I. 
37. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633–634 (1886) (“We are also clearly of [the] 
opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by 
reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal.”). 
38. See infra Part III. 











suggests two ways in which civil asset forfeiture might be brought under the 
Crawford umbrella and suggests further extensions of the Crawford 
doctrine into civil contexts. 
I. WHAT IS THE CRAWFORD DOCTRINE? 
In 2003, the Supreme Court took up Crawford v. Washington.39 Michael 
Crawford had been convicted of stabbing Kenneth Lee, a man he accused 
of attempting to rape his wife.40 While Mr. Crawford did not deny the 
stabbing, he asserted a claim of self-defense.41 Crucial to this defense was 
the question of whether Mr. Lee had drawn a weapon prior to being 
stabbed.42 Mr. and Mrs. Crawford both made statements to the police. They 
differed slightly on this question.43 Mrs. Crawford’s statements made the 
self-defense claim less credible.44 At trial, Mrs. Crawford was barred from 
testifying under state spousal privilege laws.45 However, Mrs. Crawford’s 
statements to the police were admissible under a hearsay exception in the 
state rules of evidence,46 and they were admitted at trial over Mr. Crawford’s 
objection.47 The jury found Mr. Crawford guilty of assault.48 
Although the evidence was clearly admissible under the state rules, Mr. 
Crawford’s objection was based on a constitutional right: “to be ‘confronted 
with the witnesses against him.’”49 The Supreme Court had previously 
grappled with this precise claim, and so the trial court applied the Supreme 
Court’s rule from Ohio v. Roberts.50 There, the Court had held that: 
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at 
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is 
                                                          
39. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
40. Id. at 38. 
41. Id. at 40.  
42. Mr. and Mrs. Crawford had gone to Mr. Lee’s home to confront him, and the two men got 
into a fight. The sole factual dispute between them was whether, prior to Mr. Crawford stabbing Mr. 
Lee, the latter had drawn a weapon. See id. at 38–40.  
43. Id. at 38–39. This, at least, is the Court’s characterization. It is unclear, from the excerpts 
provided, exactly what Mr. Crawford asserted in this regard. See id. at 38–39. Mrs. Crawford, though, 
does seem to deny that Mr. Lee had a weapon. See id. at 39–40. 
44. See id. at 39 (“[B]ut her account of the fight itself was arguably different—particularly with 
respect to whether Lee had drawn a weapon before petitioner assaulted him.”). 
45. Id. at 40 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994)). Under the Washington law, with 
certain exceptions, not only may a person not be required to testify against their spouse, but such 
testimony is not permitted unless the accused spouse consents. § 5.60.060(1). 
46. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (first citing State v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 761 (Wash. 1992); then 
citing WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2003)). The relevant exception allowed for the admission of hearsay 
evidence against penal interest, and since Mrs. Crawford’s statement indicated that she went to Mr. Lee’s 
home with Mr. Crawford, her statement was against her own penal interest. Id. 
47. Id. at 40–41. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 40 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 












unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without 
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception.51 
Applying this rule to the case at bar, the trial court found Mrs. 
Crawford’s statements to the police admissible since the statements 
possessed the requisite indicia of reliability.52 The Washington Court of 
Appeals reversed, finding the statements insufficiently reliable.53 In turn, 
the Washington Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s conviction, 
finding the statements sufficiently reliable.54 
Crucially, the reasoning in the state courts consistently relied on the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Roberts, even though the courts reached 
different conclusions.55 All along, it was assumed that reliability was the 
key consideration, as the Court held in Roberts.56 At first glance, this seems 
beside the point: the Confrontation Clause guarantee does not contain an 
exception for reliable evidence.57 It is worth noting, then, why the Supreme 
Court had reached this conclusion in Roberts. As the Court explained, “a 
primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-
examination.”58 Cross-examination is valuable because it secures the 
“integrity of the fact-finding process.”59 As a result, the Court in Roberts 
held that where other evidence of reliability is present, the confrontation 
requirement could be set aside as superfluous.60 Such, at least, was the 
situation heading into the Court’s consideration of Crawford. 
In Crawford, however, the Supreme Court did not further refine the 
indicia of reliability test, or even offer a different test. Instead, the Court set 
aside its Roberts jurisprudence.61 While acknowledging that, under the 
                                                          
51. Id. at 66. 
52. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
53. Id. at 41. 
54. Id. at 41–42. 
55. See id. at 40–42. The appeals court found the statements unreliable for several reasons. Id. at 
41. The state supreme court agreed that it did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception yet held 
that it was reliable enough to be permitted under Roberts since it “interlock[ed]” with Mr. Crawford’s 
testimony. Id. (quoting State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002)). 
56. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d at 662 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66) (“Thus, we must 
determine whether the statement contains a sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the confrontation 
clause.”). 
57. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
58. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). 
59. Id. at 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). 
60. See id. at 66. 
61. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–62. While the Court makes clear that it is rejecting the reasoning 
of Roberts, it takes pains to distinguish the holding in that case, noting that in Roberts, the admitted out-
of-court statements were subject to cross-examination by the defendant at the time they were made. See 
id. at 58. Thus, according to Scalia, Crawford is revolutionary only in its reasoning, and the Court’s 
prior Confrontation Clause holdings have, without saying so, respected the distinction articulated in 











Roberts test, the evidence against Mr. Crawford was admissible,62 the Court 
nonetheless held that admitting the evidence would violate the 
Confrontation Clause.63 In a unanimous judgment,64 and an opinion 
authored by Justice Scalia, the Court held that certain sorts of hearsay 
evidence violated the Confrontation Clause when admitted against criminal 
defendants, even though admissible under the applicable rules of evidence.65 
In the jurisprudence announced in Crawford, the distinction between 
admissible and inadmissible evidence in criminal cases, turned not on 
reliability, but on the precise contours of the Sixth Amendment guarantee.66 
Therefore, under the reasoning in Crawford, the Court turned away from 
the Roberts Court’s goal-oriented balancing of “competing interests,”67 and 
endorsed a formalist view of confrontation.68  
In setting out this new doctrine, the Court provided only a rough sketch 
of the outer limits of the confrontation guarantee. Certainly, the doctrine 
                                                          
Crawford. Id. Although Scalia would later refer often to the “Crawford Doctrine,” he treats it here as 
standard Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, inadequately explained in prior cases. 
62. See id. at 62 (“The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary 
process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.”). However, there might be reason to doubt 
this claim, and the Court perhaps could have suppressed the evidence without overruling Roberts. See 
supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67 (admitting same, while arguing 
that opinions below show a lack of clarity in prior opinions); infra note 64 and accompanying text. But 
see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 64–66 (discussing ways lower courts have applied the Roberts test). It is 
possible that the Court chose to overrule Roberts because of this confusion in the lower courts. 
63. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (“In this case, the State admitted Sylvia’s testimonial statement 
against petitioner, despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine her. That alone is 
sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment.”). 
64. In a concurrence joined by Justice O’Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the 
testimony would be properly excluded under Roberts, and that, accordingly, the Court should not have 
reached the question of overturning Roberts. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Furthermore, the 
concurrence argues that the reasoning here is incorrect, and the “indicia of reliability” approach, in 
addition to reaching the Court’s conclusion here, is preferable on its face. See id. at 69–76.  
65. See id. at 68 (majority opinion). An exception, based on founding-era precedents, exists for 
unavailable declarants where a prior opportunity for cross-examination existed, along with other 
exceptions motivated by the same historical analysis. 
66. As the Court explained, this shift is necessitated by the understanding that the guarantee is 
procedural, not substantive. Id. at 61. Confrontation is a process for testing reliability, and so admitting 
testimony without confrontation because it is reliable is putting the cart before the horse, or “akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.” Id. at 62. 
67. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). 
68. The question of purpose-focus or literalism in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was not a 
new one. In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), for example, the Court permitted alleged child 
abuse victims to testify via closed-circuit television under certain circumstances. Id. at 857. In a vigorous 
dissent, Justice Scalia applied much the same reasoning as in Crawford, pointing out “[t]o say that a 
defendant loses his right to confront a witness when that would cause the witness not to testify is rather 
like saying that the defendant loses his right to counsel when counsel would save him, or his right to 
subpoena witnesses when they would exculpate him, or his right not to give testimony against himself 
when that would prove him guilty,” id. at 867 (Scalia, J., dissenting), while arguing that, regardless of 
the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, it cannot be satisfied by any procedure where no literal 












would not bar all hearsay evidence.69 The Confrontation Clause guarantees 
the accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”70 
Much turns, then, on the meaning of “witness.” One could imagine a 
definition under which the Confrontation Clause would be trivial in this 
context: if a “witness” is simply a person testifying at trial in the current 
action, all that would be promised would be the right of cross-examination.71 
To discern the precise meaning of “witness,” Scalia employed his well-
known “original public meaning” originalism.72 After a historical analysis,73 
Scalia concluded that the intended meaning of “witness” includes anyone 
who offers testimony against the accused, not just those who testify in court. 
But only those who testify in court can be confronted. Thus, what the right 
to confrontation bars is the sort of out of court statement which makes a 
non-testifying declarant a witness against the accused, which Scalia calls 
“testimonial hearsay.”74  
Although “testimonial” was left undefined, Scalia noted that various 
proposed definitions share a “common nucleus”75 and differ only in “levels 
of abstraction”76 around this core. This nucleus seems to include, “at a 
minimum . . . prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial; and . . . police interrogations.”77 The core of testimonial 
hearsay, then, is out of court statements made to government officials by a 
declarant who does not testify as part of a legal proceeding or criminal 
investigation.78 This core was sufficient to decide the case at bar, and the 
Court left it to future cases to explore how far the concept extends beyond 
its core.79 
                                                          
69. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“This focus also suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth 
Amendment’s core concerns.”). 
70. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
71. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42–43 (“One could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant 
to mean those who actually testify at trial . . . .”) (citing Woodsides v. State, 3 Miss. 655, 664–65 (1837)). 
Such an interpretation, it should be noted, does not reduce the Clause to a triviality. It could guarantee, 
for example, the in-person presence of the accuser. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. For a 
critical discussion of the Crawford definition of “witness,” see George Fisher, Essay, The Crawford 
Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 17, 19–20 (2014). 
72. Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 422 
(2013). 
73. This historical analysis includes, as discussed below, an examination of common-law 
precedents. See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48–51. Scalia links the Sixth Amendment to the 
common-law precedents, suggesting that the Amendment codified the common-law understanding of 
confrontation. See id. at 50. 
74. E.g., id. at 53. 
75. Id. at 52. 
76. Id.  
77. Id. at 68. 
78. Id. 
79. Defending its choice to leave the concept undefined, the Court distinguished between this 
temporary uncertainty and the permanent uncertainty given by the unclear Roberts standard. See id. at 
68 n.10. 











The Crawford doctrine, then, is a constitutional prohibition on the 
admission of specific types of out of court statements made against a 
criminal defendant. It is justified by the claim that such statements, if 
admitted, would permit witnesses to accuse the defendant without 
confrontation, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
II. THE PRE-CRAWFORD WORLD  
The Crawford doctrine was mined from the historical backdrop to the 
Sixth Amendment. To understand the Sixth Amendment, Scalia looked to 
the historical common-law understanding of confrontation.80 That history, 
though, does not support the rigid distinction in Crawford. Rather, it 
suggests that confrontation extends well beyond the criminal context. Pre-
Crawford Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, while more permissive as to the 
admission of testimonial hearsay, was also more permissive in the 
application of confrontation concerns in civil contexts. The Crawford 
doctrine, similarly, should extend to certain civil contexts; namely civil 
forfeiture. 
Because Scalia situated Crawford historically, this Note will proceed 
historically in analyzing the law of confrontation. In analyzing the correct 
reach of the doctrine, it will turn first to its predecessors. These are of two 
sorts. First, early American cases applying common law evidence rules 
regarding confrontation but not construing the Sixth Amendment will 
demonstrate the common-law context. Next, the pre-Crawford 
understanding of the Sixth Amendment will be analyzed to see how 
Crawford modified the landscape. 
A. Common Law of Confrontation 
We turn first to early common law cases.81 Crawford’s originalist logic 
presupposes that there be a common understanding of the scope of 
confrontation at the time of ratification, upon which the modern jurist 
should rely.82 What we find, instead, is confusion.  
A case in point is United States v. Macomb, where the court both denied 
a distinction between civil and criminal cases and recognized the confused 
state of the law.83 In this action for mail theft, the court admitted, over 
                                                          
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
81. The cases that follow are state cases occurring either before the Fourteenth Amendment or 
prior to incorporation. Hence, they do not apply the Sixth Amendment. These cases are informative 
precisely because we know that state cases prior to the Fourteenth Amendment are not influenced by the 
Sixth Amendment, despite it already having been ratified.  
82. See generally Barnett, supra note 72. 












objection, statements made by a witness, deceased at the time of trial, during 
a preliminary examination.84 Denying a motion for a new trial, the court 
upheld the admission of the evidence.85 The statements were sworn 
testimony, and the defendant was able to cross-examine.86  
In finding the evidence admissible, the court explicitly considered 
whether evidentiary issues regarding confrontation are treated differently in 
civil and criminal trials.87 The Macomb court answered that there was no 
such distinction.88 Rather, the defining question was the ability to cross-
examine: testimony without opportunity to cross-examine would be 
inadmissible in any case, and testimony offered with cross-examination 
would be admissible in any case.89 The court also leaned heavily on the 
death of the declarant, noting that such evidence would likely be 
inadmissible if the declarant were alive.90  
The court’s explicit rejection of different admission rules for testimonial 
hearsay in civil and criminal cases is striking.91 Certainly, the court did not 
disregard history in making this conclusion. The court discusses, for 
instance, the Fenwick case,92 relied upon in Crawford.93 Yet it reads the 
history, from common-law and American precedents, as “so great a conflict 
of authorities [that] the court is at liberty to decide the question upon 
principle.”94 Because the court here considered the common-law 
precedents, Macomb stands for the proposition that early American courts 
considered the question not fully resolved.95  
                                                          
84. Id. at 1132. 
85. Id. at 1133. 
86. Id. Although the defendant here took advantage of the opportunity to engage in “long and 
tedious cross-examination,” id. at 1132, other cases have made clear that, even in the absence of such 
cross-examination, it suffices that the defendant had knowledge that the examination was taking place 
and could have cross-examined. See, e.g., Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. 344 (1842). Because knowledge of 
the examination is not the same as knowledge of the specific topics covered, one might think that actual 
presence or actual cross-examination is therefore required. The defendant could argue that had he known 
what would be discussed, he would have cross-examined. 
87. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. at 1133–34. 
88. Id. at 1134 (“If it be, on the whole, a sound rule to admit the declarations of a deceased 
witness, made on a former trial, in a case involving property or reputation, it is equally so in cases 




92. Id. at 1133. In this trial for treason, witnesses against him left the country, and Fenwick was 
not convicted. Id. He did not, though, escape punishment, since Parliament then passed a bill of attainder. 
Id. That is not generally an option in American criminal prosecutions. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
In so doing, it relied upon a deposition given by an absent witness, while noting that such evidence 
would not be admissible in a court of law. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. at 1133. As the court notes, though, the 
witnesses in Fenwick were not dead, and there had been no opportunity for cross-examination. Id. 
93. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 45–46 (2004). 
94. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. at 1134. 
95. See id. at 1133–34 (discussing conflicts of authorities and earlier cases). 











These early common-law cases provide significant evidence that there 
was no firm line dividing civil and criminal cases in terms of hearsay and 
confrontation. Crary v. Sprague & Craw96 not only illustrates this history, 
but also employs reasoning later echoed in pre-Crawford Sixth Amendment 
case law.97 In a civil action to secure the payment of debt,98 the plaintiff in 
Crary was able to admit, over the defendant’s objection, testimony given at 
a previous trial on the same matter99 by a witness who had died between the 
two trials. On a motion for a new trial, however, the court held that the 
evidence was improperly admitted.100 That is, the court ruled that 
testimonial hearsay, even from a dead declarant, was not admissible even in 
a civil matter.101  
The circumstances of Crary were complicated. The declarant had 
testified at the first trial for the defense; at the second trial, the plaintiff 
sought to admit the testimony.102 That the witness testified originally for the 
party which later opposed admission can cut either way. The court 
considered the possibility that this weighed in favor of admission; after all, 
where the defendant introduced the evidence at the first trial, it is odd to 
argue against its admissibility at the second.103 The court concluded, though, 
that the more decisive point was that the defendant was unable to rebut the 
testimony as would have been possible if the declarant had testified at the 
second trial.104 That is, the totality of the circumstances here cut against 
admissibility, in the court’s view; the court did not hold that such testimony 
is never admissible in civil cases.105 
Nor did the Crary court hold that the standard for admissibility of 
testimonial hearsay is the same for civil and criminal cases. The court laid 
out rules for the admission of such evidence: it may only be admitted where 
the declarant is deceased and where the possibility for cross-examination 
                                                          
96. Crary v. Sprague & Craw, 12 Wend. 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). 
97. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), discussed infra at Part II.B. 
98. Crary, 12 Wend. at 44.  
99. Id. This case followed a successful action in trover, where it emerged, after the judgment, 
that the disputed property was not held by either party, but by one of the witnesses at the original action. 
Id. at 44. This action was to prove the sale of the property. Id. at 44. It was the testimony of this witness, 
believed to have been in a conspiracy to deny the plaintiff of his title to the property via a newer sale, 
that was in dispute. Id. at 45–46. 
100. Id. at 46. However, the court denied a motion for a retrial, since “the jury w[as] bound to 
render their verdict for the plaintiff independently of that testimony . . . .” Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 45–46. 
103. But see id. (noting that, although called by the defendant, the witness was not in any other 
sense the defendant’s witness). 
104. See id. at 46. 
105. See id. (“The position of a cause at the circuit sometimes makes it expedient . . . to risque the 
testimony of a witness interested against him . . . . [I]t would be a hard measure of justice to say the 
witness should ever after be not only a competent, but a credible witness in the cause for his adversary, 












existed prior to death.106 Even then, the court held that evidence would be 
admitted only when necessary to decide the case.107 It is possible that the 
Crary court would hold the standard of necessity to be more demanding in 
a criminal than a civil case. 
The court did, though, deal explicitly with the notion that testimonial 
hearsay is categorically inadmissible in criminal cases, the position 
Crawford would later embrace.108 While noting that such a position enjoys 
considerable support, the court summarily rejected it.109 Acknowledging 
that such evidence should be admitted only rarely, the court, in dicta, refused 
to draw a bright-line rule between civil and criminal cases.110  
Other cases explicitly compared the rules in civil and criminal cases, 
inferring rules for criminal cases from those in civil cases. In Finn v. 
Commonwealth,111 a criminal defendant was convicted of forgery of bank 
notes.112 During a preliminary hearing, a Mr. Candler had testified against 
the defendant.113 While in jail awaiting trial, the defendant told another 
witness that what Mr. Candler had said was true.114 The conversation ended 
there, but the defendant alleged that he had intended to go on to say that Mr. 
Candler’s statements were incomplete and framed in such a manner as to 
falsely make the defendant appear guilty.115 The court permitted the witness 
to testify at trial about the defendant’s statement.116 On this foundation, the 
prosecution admitted Mr. Candler’s prior testimony.117 Mr. Candler had left 
the jurisdiction by the time of trial and was still alive.118 On appeal, the 
defendant challenged this testimony, and the appeals court reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.119 
While the defendant had argued on appeal that the testimony was 
admitted on an insufficient foundation, the appeals court ruled on a different 
ground—that, regardless of the foundation, the testimony of Mr. Candler 
should not have been admitted at trial.120 Noting that past testimony from 
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108. See id. at 44–45. 
109. Id. (“[I]t seems even still to be questioned by high authority if it be admissible at all in a 
criminal case, though I think it would.”) (internal citations omitted). 
110. See id. 
111. Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. 701 (1827). 
112. Id. at 706. 
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deceased witnesses is admissible in civil trials where the party against 
whom the testimony is admitted had the possibility of cross-examination in 
the prior proceeding, the court found that this rule did not extend to criminal 
cases, nor to civil cases where the declarant is unavailable but alive.121  
Thus, the Finn court gave a highly restrictive form of the rule on 
testimonial hearsay. This provided two grounds for rejecting the evidence 
here: that the case was criminal,122 and that the declarant was alive. The 
court did not spell out how it would have ruled on a dead declarant in a civil 
case, but it did indicate that, even in a civil case, it would have prohibited 
testimonial statements from a live declarant.123 
Thus, the right to confrontation existed, in common-law, in civil cases. 
That right, it is true, did not form the absolute bar described in Crawford. 
But the right to confrontation was less than absolute in criminal contexts as 
well.  
In fact, some courts held that confrontation was less applicable in 
criminal than civil contexts. A case in point is Johnston v. State.124 While 
Finn held that a right to confrontation, and hence ban on testimonial 
hearsay, exists in the civil context, Johnston sharply limited the prohibition 
on testimonial hearsay in criminal cases by holding that depositions, taken 
without the ability to cross-examine, may be admitted against criminal 
defendants where the deposed witness is deceased.125 Nor did the Johnston 
court simply have a more limited view of confrontation, spanning criminal 
and civil cases; one of the reasons given for permitting such evidence was 
precisely the fact that the case was criminal.126 The court reasoned that 
prohibiting these depositions would incentivize killing adverse witnesses.127 
The court seems to have assumed that this is a greater concern for criminal 
defendants than civil litigants.128  
While a guilty defendant facing criminal charges might kill to avoid 
them, this is less likely to be true of civil litigants seeking to avoid financial 
loss or to secure financial gain. At the same time, civil litigants can face 
risks similar in scope to those accused of crimes, particularly 
misdemeanors.129 Johnston seems to echo even earlier history, which 
                                                          
121. Id.  
122. Id. 
123. Id. (“Nor can we find that the rule in civil cases extends to the admission of the evidence 
formerly given by a witness who has removed beyond the jurisdiction of the country . . . .”) 
124. 10 Tenn. 58 (1821). 
125. Id. at 59. 
126. See id. at 60. 
127. Id. 
128. See id. 
129. In this regard, see discussion of Mr. Parhamovich, supra Introduction, whose civil liability 












distinguished between felonies and misdemeanors for just this reason.130 
Accused felons gained the right to confrontation later, historically, than did 
misdemeanants.131 Following this logic, the prohibition on testimonial 
hearsay is strong in inverse proportion to the liability faced by the party 
opposing admission.132 But Crawford applies in all criminal cases, 
regardless of the level of liability; to be consistent with the reasoning in 
Johnston, testimonial hearsay should be barred in civil cases where liability 
is less than that in the most serious criminal cases.  
The common law, then, did not have an absolute prohibition on 
testimonial hearsay in criminal cases, and the prohibition in civil cases may 
have been understood to be just as strong as that in criminal cases. The right 
to confrontation appears to have been a common law right in all legal 
proceedings. It is in light of this common law tradition that the Sixth 
Amendment should be understood. 
However, this history may seem irrelevant. Even if the reasoning of these 
cases suggests Crawford should extend to the civil forfeiture context, the 
objection would go, the Fourteenth Amendment changed the landscape by 
incorporating the Sixth Amendment to the states.133 The Sixth Amendment 
could, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and as understood by 
Crawford, strengthen protections in the one case but not the other. That is, 
the Confrontation Clause could have guaranteed confrontation rights in 
criminal cases without impacting civil litigation and overridden any 
common law history suggesting that confrontation is the same in both cases.  
This problem with this objection is that the point of Crawford is precisely 
that the Sixth Amendment codified an existing understanding of 
confrontation, and that understanding must govern its interpretation.134 It is 
immediate, via familiar originalist arguments, that public understanding 
determines the bounds of the Sixth Amendment, and therefore, of 
                                                          
130. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Dialogue, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s 
Cross-Examination Rule: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 594–96 (2007). 
131. See Thomas Y. Davies, Symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the 
Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past: What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? 
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (2005); see also Robert 
Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A Response to Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 
493, 506 (2007). 
132. This reasoning, then, would guarantee confrontation in a routine civil case, but perhaps not 
a “bet the business” patent dispute. Similarly, an accused shoplifter would be guaranteed the right to 
cross examine witnesses, but not necessarily an accused murderer. This reasoning, of course, is 
independent of Sixth Amendment guarantees.  
133. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (recognizing incorporation of the 
Sixth Amendment). 
134. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004) (“We must therefore turn to the 
historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning.”); see also supra note 73 and 
accompanying text. 











Crawford.135 Therefore, these early cases control our interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment, because that Amendment incorporated the common law 
history, and with it, the understanding that confrontation is equally 
guaranteed in both contexts. 
B. Sixth Amendment (and Related) Cases 
Just as common-law evidence cases do not suggest a sharp line between 
civil and criminal cases in terms of confrontation, neither do cases 
interpreting the Sixth Amendment and its state constitution analogues. The 
latter naturally forms a bridge between the state court analysis of the 
common law and the cases construing the Sixth Amendment, and so will be 
analyzed first.  
Noting that testimonial hearsay, when admissible, must be presented in 
full, the court in Commonwealth v. Richards held testimony summarizing 
the statements of a then-deceased declarant held inadmissible.136 In this 
criminal case for perjury, the court was construing the Confrontation Clause 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.137 The court first held that 
testimonial statements from deceased declarants did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause.138 Since a witness was recounting what was said by 
the declarant, the testimony was being offered “face to face.”139 The court 
considered, and rejected, the Crawford notion of an absolute prohibition on 
testimonial hearsay in criminal cases.140 More importantly, the court looked 
to the civil precedent to find rules governing the admission of testimonial 
hearsay.141 “But the rules of evidence in civil and in criminal cases are 
generally the same,”142 said the court. It then went on to deduce that such 
depositions are generally admissible, but not where misleadingly 
incomplete, as in the case at bar.143 And it did so in reliance on an analysis 
of a civil case.144  
                                                          
135. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 
(1997). 
136. Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. 434, 439 (1836) 
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141. Id. at 438. 
142. Id.  
143. Id. at 439. 












Of course, this is not to call into question the prohibition in Crawford145; 
the Court there was construing a different Clause, and, even if the results 
were contradictory, could have gotten the interpretation correct. However, 
the logic of Crawford suggests that state constitutional confrontation 
provisions should be interpreted the same way as the Sixth Amendment. 
They arose from the same common-law roots and codified the same pre-
existing understanding.146 Richards shows us, then, that the early 
understanding of constitutional confrontation provisions did not absolutely 
bar testimonial hearsay in the criminal or civil context. Rather, it was 
analyzed case-by-case, and the same analysis was applied in both contexts. 
This common ancestry, so to speak, and uniform application suggests that 
the rules should remain the same in criminal and civil contexts; when a new 
rule is announced in one context, it should apply in both. 
In State v. Houser, the Missouri Supreme Court dealt explicitly with the 
history of the Confrontation Clause and gave an early foreshadowing of 
Crawford.147 In this homicide case, the prosecution introduced the 
deposition of a live witness who was outside the jurisdiction of the court at 
the time of trial.148 The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.149 
Holding the evidence inadmissible, the state Supreme Court reversed.150 
In construing the Sixth Amendment, the court placed it within the context 
of the American Revolution.151 That Revolution, the court noted, was about 
“the rights and privileges which [sic] were secured to British subjects.”152 
The court explained that, therefore, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause was to be understood as guaranteeing that right as it was understood 
in the British common law and statutory law at the time, adapted to 
American circumstances.153 It equated depositions from deceased declarants 
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149. Id. 
150. Id. at 441. In Missouri, appeals raising constitutional issues, whether the Missouri 
Constitution or the US Constitution, may proceed directly to the state Supreme Court without passing 
through the intermediate appeals court. MO. CONST. art. V, § 3. At the time of this case, there were no 
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with dying declarations; because the common law, and American 
precedents, had permitted dying declarations, it followed that the 
Constitution could not have prohibited these depositions.154  
In Houser, though, the declarant was not dead, only unavailable.155 By 
explicitly linking the admissibility of depositions to the admissibility of 
dying declarations, the court reasoned that unavailable deponents were 
different, and their depositions inadmissible.156 
Houser, like Crawford after it, explicitly held that this prohibition 
applied, at least in its strongest form, only in criminal cases.157 This is 
because the revolutionary assertion of the rights of British subjects was 
about rights as against the government.158 The revolutionaries asserted 
“immunities and privileges granted and confirmed to them by royal 
charters.”159 These did not include any particular rules of evidence in civil 
matters.  
The Houser court, though, did not explicitly reject such a prohibition, as 
the Crawford Court did. In fact, it arguably left the door open to a 
prohibition on testimonial hearsay in certain civil cases. The civil cases 
under consideration here, such as assert forfeiture, are indeed against the 
government. The common law may well have extended the same 
protections, including the right of confrontation, in such proceedings, if they 
were used then as they are today.160 We are left with the open-ended 
question of just what the rights of British subjects against their government 
were; the Crawford court assumed that those rights applied only in criminal 
cases, but without proof.161 The revolutionaries, after all, fought just as 
much against arbitrary seizure of goods as against abusive criminal 
prosecution.162 
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The foil against which Crawford operated was Ohio v. Roberts.163 The 
pre-Crawford approach is typified by this criminal case, in which the 
defendant was charged with forgery and possession of stolen credit cards.164 
At a preliminary hearing, the defense called the victim’s daughter, Anita 
Isaacs, to testify.165 At trial, the prosecution sought to subpoena the same 
witness, but was unable to produce her for trial.166 The prosecution, then, 
using a state law provision,167 sought to admit the transcript of her 
preliminary examination testimony.168 When her mother presented evidence 
that Anita Isaacs could not be located, the transcript was admitted over 
objection.169 The defendant was convicted.170 The appeals court reversed, 
finding that the prosecution had not sufficiently shown the witness’ 
unavailability.171 The Ohio Supreme Court found that the witness was 
unavailable, but affirmed the judgment of the appeals court because the 
defendant had not had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.172 
Considering just the common-law holdings, the case echoes Crary.173 
Just as in that case, the issue here was the admission, against one party, of 
the transcript of that party’s own witness in a prior proceeding. The Crary 
court likely would have refused to admit the evidence, based on the same 
reasoning as the Ohio Supreme Court, making this case the criminal 
analogue of Crary. However, the case would take a different turn at the 
Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court, holding that the 
evidence was properly admitted.174 The Court in Roberts considered the 
Confrontation Clause as inextricably linked to the common-law 
jurisprudence around the hearsay rule and its exceptions.175 Indeed, the 
Court began with the claim that, strictly applied, the Confrontation Clause 
would “abrogate virtually every hearsay exception [in criminal cases].”176 
Considering this result untenable, the Court concluded that some 
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unconfronted evidence must be admissible.177 This echoes Crary once 
again, this time in its “necessity” reasoning.178 The Court reasoned that the 
Confrontation Clause imposed two requirements. First, it required that the 
government show the unavailability. This weakened the previous 
requirement that the declarant be deceased, but served the same purpose: a 
demonstration of necessity.179 Second, it required that the government show 
that the evidence is reliable enough to obviate the need for cross-
examination at trial.180 The government could demonstrate the latter either 
by fitting a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,”181 or through “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”182 
In Roberts, the Court relied upon the Ohio Supreme Court’s finding that 
the witness was unavailable.183 It then reversed the decision of that court by 
finding that the evidence bore “indicia of reliability.”184 Although there was 
no opportunity to cross-examine, the Court held that the questioning at the 
preliminary examination was similar enough to cross-examination to yield 
the same reliability guarantee.185 
This historical analysis shows Roberts for what it is. While Scalia in 
Crawford claims Roberts reached the right conclusion for the wrong 
reason,186 the method employed in Roberts is not distinct from that in 
Crawford. What differs is the weight given to the various factors in the 
historical analysis. While Crawford emphasizes the metaphor between 
testimonial hearsay and ex-parte preliminary hearings,187 Roberts places 
testimonial hearsay within the hearsay context and analyzes reliability and 
necessity. Although Scalia caricatures Roberts as ignoring the right to 
confrontation whenever it seemed unlikely to sway the jury,188 the Roberts 
analysis fit squarely into the common law understanding of confrontation 
interpreting the Sixth Amendment in parallel to the common law right of 
confrontation in civil proceedings. As in Macomb, the Roberts Court looked 
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to the availability of cross-examination, not as a formal requirement, but as 
a factor in determining reliability.189 While Roberts expands the scope of 
unavailability by including live declarants who are unable to testify, it 
follows Crary in looking to the necessity for accurate adjudication.190  
The holding in Crawford corrected the Roberts jurisprudence by fully 
incorporating the plain language of the Sixth Amendment and providing 
greater protection for criminal defendants. To remain true to its common-
law sources, Crawford requires not only the prohibition on testimonial 
hearsay in criminal cases Scalia delivered, but also simultaneous protections 
in civil actions. That is, the historical analysis shows that Roberts was right 
in connecting the criminal and civil standards, as was the case in Crary. The 
Court’s decision in Crawford, that greater protection was needed in criminal 
cases, therefore should not leave civil cases unprotected. Instead, as a matter 
of policy and logic, the standard for admission should remain the same in 
criminal cases as in civil cases, which are suitably similar. Since Crawford 
understands the Sixth Amendment to require an absolute prohibition in 
criminal cases, that prohibition should similarly apply in certain civil 
contexts. The suitably similar cases include, at a minimum, civil forfeiture. 
III. SOLUTIONS 
Crawford’s historical reasoning relied upon incorporating the common-
law understanding of confrontation into the Sixth Amendment.191 This 
common-law understanding did not differentiate between the civil and 
criminal contexts.192 The Sixth Amendment’s enhanced protections for 
criminal defendants, seen through this lens, should find their way to certain 
civil contexts. Crawford’s reasoning means that the gate between the 
criminal and civil worlds, while not fully open, allows passage of some 
Confrontation Clause vessels. Civil forfeiture is an area of law ripe for such 
commerce. 
A. Constitutional Solutions 
The argument for Crawford protections in the civil forfeiture context 
proceeds by analogy. Beginning with two points, criminal law and civil 
forfeiture, sitting remote from one another, Crawford’s history has 
advanced criminal procedural protections in the civil direction. This Part 
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will now argue that civil forfeiture resembles a criminal context, continuing 
to narrow the gap between the two points. The goal, of course, is to bring 
them close enough that their distance is of no constitutional moment.193  
Nor is there much distance to travel.194 As early as 1886, the Court 
narrowed the gap in Boyd v. United States.195 The Court in Boyd declared 
unconstitutional a tax law providing for forfeiture of items imported under 
falsified paperwork, such that the “United States shall be deprived of the 
lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise . . . 
.”196 The law also authorized the government to demand invoices and other 
evidence, in order to prove fraud for forfeiture purposes.197 The case at bar 
was a forfeiture action, with no associated criminal prosecution, issued for 
twenty-nine cases of glass.198 As part of the proceeding, the District Court 
issued a court order, requiring the owners of the glass to produce invoices, 
which were then used as evidence in the forfeiture action.199 The jury found 
for the government and the property was forfeited.200 The owners 
challenged the action under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Circuit 
Court affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment.201 For present 
purposes, the Court’s Fifth Amendment analysis is most relevant.  
The compelled production of invoices can only be a Fifth Amendment 
violation if there is a criminal charge, and so the Court took up the question 
of whether there was such a prosecution. En route to holding the law 
unconstitutional,202 the Court held that “proceedings instituted for the 
purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences 
committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature 
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criminal.”203 This was because, inter alia, the forfeiture was based on 
allegations of both criminal fraud and tax evasion.204 To treat such forfeiture 
as civil based solely on the form of the proceeding would allow the 
government to choose to proceed, in an otherwise criminal case, to “take 
from the proceeding its criminal aspect and deprive the claimants of their 
immunities as citizens.”205 It is, according to the Court, the substance of the 
claim that governs. And the substance here was that the items were subject 
to forfeiture for violation of criminal laws; hence, the substance was 
criminal. The process due flows from this substance, not from form.206 
It is true that, “[i]n spite of the Boyd Court’s admonition, the courts have, 
for the most part, long abandoned this duty with respect to civil 
forfeitures.”207 Yet this is no reason that the courts cannot again take up this 
cudgel. Since Crawford’s logic suggests application in the civil context, 
Crawford can serve a useful function in reining in forfeiture. 
To see the criminal nature of civil forfeiture proceedings, their precise 
nature must be analyzed. “The distinguishing characteristic of a criminal 
forfeiture provision is that, unlike the in-rem character of civil forfeiture, 
the personal guilt of the defendant is at issue.”208 By inversion, then, a civil 
forfeiture proceeding is an in-rem proceeding where the personal guilt of 
the defendant is not at issue. The Court has explained that the justification 
for this rests “upon the fiction that inanimate objects themselves can be 
guilty of wrongdoing.”209 Yet this fiction is not without its critics, among 
them Blackstone, who described it as “based upon a ‘superstition’ inherited 
from the ‘blind days’ of feudalism.”210 The notion that property commits 
crimes on its own is an objectionable basis for claiming civil forfeiture 
                                                          
203. Id. at 633–34. 
204. See id. at 634. 
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206. See id. The case of Phil Parhamovich, see discussion supra Introduction, also presented this 
Fifth Amendment issue. Precisely this situation is described in Jay A. Rosenberg, Note, Constitutional 
Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 390, 397 (1988), as a “double bind.” As 
Rosenberg explains, claimants must assert property interests to fight forfeiture proceedings. Id. 
Asserting property interests, where the government alleges that the property was involved in a crime, 
though, means waiving the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. Parhamovich denied his property 
rights precisely to avoid perceived self-incrimination. Thus are Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights 
intertwined in this context, forming a second “double bind” and escaping constitutional scrutiny only 
because of the fiction that forfeiture is non-criminal. 
207. Piety, supra note 16, at 921. 
208. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 
1 (1827)). 
209. United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971). This case concerned 
forfeiture proceedings after the Circuit Court voided criminal convictions. The government, rather than 
challenging the voiding, proceeded on the theory that the owner’s guilt or innocence was irrelevant if 
the money was used illegally, in this case in violation of tax laws. Id. at 718–19. As the Court noted, the 
government’s view amounted to the claim that, if money is left in an office, and is then used for illegal 
gambling by someone other than its owner, it may be forfeited. Id. 
210. Id. at 720–21 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *300). 











actions are not criminal.211 That which was an ancient superstition to 
William Blackstone ought not be unquestioned truth today. 
Thus, not only do forfeiture actions resemble criminal proceedings,212 
but also, any effort to explain why they are not criminal to the modern 
listener is doomed to fail. The modern world is unwilling to accept that 
objects commit crimes or become possessed by devils, or that they may be 
cleansed by being given to God’s agent on Earth, the government. However, 
a definitive answer on this question is not needed. It is enough to say: where 
it is doubtful that the proceedings can be anything but criminal accusations 
against the property owners, and it is doubtful that a procedural protection 
such as Crawford does not apply in civil contexts, the “double doubt” 
should be resolved in favor of the protection of innocents.213 
What’s more, even Crawford’s explicit limitation to criminal contexts is 
unavailing.214 This is because, following the same logic as Crawford’s main 
holding, Crawford’s reference to criminal contexts must mean criminal as 
understood by the Sixth Amendment. When the Sixth Amendment refers to 
criminal proceedings, it codifies the common-law understanding of criminal 
law. As we have seen, although today we understand civil forfeiture 
contexts to be outside of criminal law, the common-law understanding 
contemporary with the sources Crawford drew on viewed forfeiture as 
criminal and granted criminal protections under the Fifth Amendment.215 
Therefore, for Crawford’s purposes, forfeiture must fall under the criminal 
law umbrella. 
B. Legislative Solutions 
While judicial action is the most obvious remedy, legislative action may 
be more palatable in light of separation of power concerns. As a matter of 
right, following the arguments above, Crawford extends to civil contexts. It 
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214. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (looking only to the past treatment of 
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their holdings but cannot restrict the reach of their logic or precedents. 












remains for the courts, though, to determine precisely which civil contexts. 
After all, this insight is grounded in the common-law, and the notion that 
the common-law of confrontation was codified by the Sixth Amendment, 
not some abstract notion of confrontation roaming at large. Pre-Crawford 
Sixth Amendment cases hewed true to this common-law doctrine, just as 
Crawford did. Crawford changed the landscape by expanding the realm of 
exclusion. The courts need to determine, as a matter of constitutional law, 
just how far into the civil realm Crawford reaches. Due to the similarity 
between civil forfeiture and criminal prosecutions, the courts should expand 
Crawford to include civil forfeiture. However, this raises separation of 
power concerns and may, at least in the eyes of a cautious jurist and the 
opponent of judicial activism, give the courts too much freedom of action. 
In the face of that objection, it is also true that Congress can, and should, 
act. 
In 2000, Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act 
(CAFRA).216 This law requires (rather incredibly) that the government show 
grounds for forfeiture to a preponderance of the evidence.217 Courts have 
held that CAFRA also required that the government’s evidence (again, 
rather incredibly) be in compliance with the FREs.218 Thus, post-CAFRA, 
hearsay is no longer admissible in civil forfeiture cases, subject to the 
exceptions in the FREs. This legislative movement in favor of limiting 
admissibility of evidence in civil forfeiture cases could be carried further by 
specifically prohibiting, either in law or in the FREs themselves, testimonial 
hearsay in such cases. 
Congress should do so. It should do so not simply because examples like 
Mr. Parhamovich show the unfairness of admitting such testimony, but 
rather because even if not constitutionally mandated, such a limitation is 
consistent with the thinking of Crawford and its constitutional reasoning. 
As seen,219 Crawford’s reasoning is premised on the Sixth Amendment’s 
codifying the existing common-law understanding of confrontation. That 
understanding, at its heart, hearkens back to negative reaction to the Marian 
                                                          
216. Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000). 
217. United States v. 92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 537 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2008). If this case 
styling looks silly, the reader might consider this yet more evidence that our intuitions reject the notion 
of guilty property. See Piety, supra note 16, at 916 n.22. 
218. See, e.g., 92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 537 F.3d at 509; see also United States v. .30 Acre 
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Bail and Committal Statutes.220 The Sixth Amendment, as explained earlier, 
is seen, as a reaction to the creep of inappropriate procedures into criminal 
law, including ex-parte testimony without cross-examination.221 In civil 
forfeiture, the same concern arises. Rather than importing procedure into 
the criminal context, though, the entire procedure has simply been migrated 
to the civil courts.222 The effect is to “bypass entirely the cumbersome 
criminal justice system, with its tedious set of impediments to investigation, 
prosecution, and conviction, and substitute a control system consisting of 
civil sanctions.”223 Exporting criminal cases out of the criminal system is no 
different than smuggling civil procedure into it.  
Just as colonial legislatures and courts, and eventually the Framers, 
reacted against the Marian Statutes by establishing the right to confrontation 
and codifying it in the Sixth Amendment, so too must we react today against 
the use of the same procedure to threaten our liberty and property.224 The 
same policy concerns that motivated the development of our current 
jurisprudence call for redress in the civil forfeiture context. If the image 
motivating Crawford, the presentation of testimony obtained in secret, 
without facing the crucible of adversarial proceedings, against criminal 
defendants, arouses our indignation, it must be no less aroused by the exact 
same procedure when applied to those who stand to lose significant property 
to the government, under a legal doctrine developed from an ancient 
superstition.  
C. Further Consequences 
While this Note has focused on civil asset forfeiture, the observation that 
Crawford’s common-law ancestry did not reliably distinguish civil and 
criminal contexts has deeper implications. Certainly, where there is “double 
doubt,” as in civil forfeiture, the argument is stronger.225 Taken seriously, 
though, the larger thesis might suggest that confrontation should, not as a 
constitutional but as a policy matter, exist in all legal proceedings. This 
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would be an uncomfortably large shift in civil procedure and would impose 
a heavy burden on the already complex task of discovery.  
Yet it is not without its own policy advantages. As Scalia notes, 
abandoning cross-examination because the testimony is reliable is akin to 
abandoning a trial where the defendant is guilty.226 We would no more, 
though, dispense with civil trials because, for instance, the contract was 
obviously breached, then we would with criminal trials because the 
defendant is obviously guilty. Certainly, most would be less comfortable 
with such a procedure in the criminal than civil context, but that is because 
of our perception of the consequences. As seen, our intuitions fail us in the 
civil forfeiture context.227 They fail us too, though, in other civil contexts. 
A misdemeanor shoplifting conviction is no picnic, but it is difficult to argue 
that it is a more extreme consequence than improperly losing a multi-
billion-dollar patent, or a civil deportation hearing. 
Moreover, intuitions can cut as easily in the other direction. If the stakes 
for the defendant are typically higher in criminal cases than for either party 
in civil matters, so are the stakes for society of a wrongful acquittal. As 
discussed, threads in the common-law history reflect this, making more 
evidence admissible in prosecutions for felonies than misdemeanors.228 
Setting aside the impact of the outcome, we can also consider the impact 
of each piece of evidence on the outcome. In criminal matters, “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” is the standard burden for conviction. In civil matters, 
either party can generally prevail on the preponderance of the evidence.229 
On average, then, an individual piece of evidence will have a larger impact 
on the outcome of a civil case than a criminal case. This is a matter, though, 
reserved for further research. 
Also reserved for further research is the impact Crawford should have 
on originalist thought. The methodology in Crawford rests uneasily with 
public-meaning originalism, yet its logic and conclusion do not. An 
understanding of originalism which incorporates the common law into the 
meaning of constitutional provisions, as a complement to the public 
meaning, can rectify this tension. This Note has illustrated just that sort of 
originalist analysis on the Confrontation Clause; it remains to develop such 
an idea philosophically and to apply it to other constitutional provisions.  
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The Crawford doctrine, presented as a matter of historical originalism, 
reads its sources in an overly narrow manner.230 It is true that the Sixth 
Amendment codified the common-law understanding of confrontation, and 
that this understanding emerged, in part, in response to abuses in the 
criminal context.231 It does not follow, however, that the common law 
limited confrontation to criminal procedure. It, in fact, did not.232 Pre-
Crawford construction of the Sixth Amendment respected the common law 
precedents.233 Far from a break with those precedents, Crawford is best seen 
as, for good reason, strengthening the protection offered in criminal cases.234 
The failure of precedent to distinguish sharply between civil and criminal 
contexts, though, means that Crawford’s protections should be applied in at 
least some civil contexts as well.235  
The civil forfeiture context is a particularly ripe context to apply these 
protections, since it is arguably a criminal context.236 Even if we are 
uncertain on both claims, there arises a “double doubt,” which ought to be 
resolved in favor of protection.237 If concerns remain about excessive 
constitutionalization of this procedure, there remain legislative options, 
which would continue an established trend.238 Finally, the prohibition on 
testimonial hearsay might logically be extended, not as a constitutional 
matter but as a policy matter, to all civil proceedings.239 
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